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Abstract – This note presents the consequences of output 
persistence being disregarded by an electorally motivated 
incumbent. In this case, incumbent’s policies are 
suboptimal not only socially but also from the electoral 
point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
The consequences arising from the fact that real 
variables, such as unemployment or output, exhibit a 
degree of persistence over time have been analysed 
since some time ago (see, e.g., Jonsson, 1997; 
Lockwood, 1997; Svensson, 1997; Caleiro, 2012). A 
particularly interesting consequence of output 
persistence is that it may turn upside down the political 
business cycle, which, in its typical form, is associated 
with depressions at the beginning of the mandate 
followed by pre-election inflationary expansions 
(Gärtner, 1996; Gärtner, 1997; Caleiro, 2009). 
Somehow related to this result is the fact that, when the 
rationality of the electorate is bounded, an error on the 
classification, by the electorate, of the incumbent’s 
behavior, may exist, when the level of output displays 
persistence (Caleiro, 2013). 
A recent observation of reality seems to confirm that the 
typical pattern of the electoral cycle seems to be so 
deep-rooted that an electorally motivated government, 
whose rationality is also bounded, considers that it must 
implement a (more than socially desirable) 
contractionary policy at the beginning of the mandate, 
so that, at the end of the mandate, it has (better) 
conditions to implement expansionary policies. A 
behavior of that type by the incumbent also seems to 
reveal that it may also act under the veil of ignorance (of 
the persistence in output). In other words, when 
determining the economic policy the incumbent may use 
a stylized model, this model being imperfect due to the 
ignorance of output persistence (Chow, 1977). In this 
case, incumbent’s policies are suboptimal not only 
socially but also from the electoral point of view. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
offers the correct model, i.e. the one ruling the true 
functioning of the economy, which is based upon an 
aggregate supply curve embodying output persistence, 
as well as the imperfect model, i.e. the one considered 
by the incumbent, which disregards output persistence. 
Section 3 concludes. 
2. The Models 
Recently some authors have assumed an extended 
version of the standard aggregate supply curve 
 ettt yy   , where ty  denotes the level of 
output,  that deviates from the natural level, y , 
whenever the inflation rate, t , deviates from its 
expected level et , by considering  
   etttt yyy   11 , (1) 
where   measures the degree of output persistence. See 
Gärtner (1999) for an output persistence case and/or 
Jonsson (1997) for an unemployment persistence case.  
When normalizing the natural level of output such that 
0y  the aggregate supply curve reduces to: 
 etttt yy   1 , (2) 
where, following the hypothesis of adaptive 
expectations, 
  ettet 11 1    , (3) 
where 10    and 10   . 
Model (2) is thus the correct representation of the 
functioning of the economy. When disregarding the 
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to be considered, i.e. 
 ettty   . (4) 
In what concerns the incumbent's objective function, we 
make the standard assumption that the incumbent faces 
a mandate divided into two periods, t = 1,2, such that 
society’s welfare during the mandate, i.e. the benevolent 
government's objective function is given by: 
21 WWW  , (5) 
where   is the social rate of discount, whereas 
opportunistic government's objective function is : 
21 VVV   , (6) 
where   is the degree of memory of the electorate. In 
(5) and (6) we also consider that  
tttt yVW  
2
2
1 . (7) 
Considering first the case of a benevolent incumbent, 
the correct policy and outcomes will be, respectively, 
the values of inflation and output which result from the 
maximisation of (5) subject to (2) and (3). This 
immediately leads to the optimal policies:1 
    11B , (8) 
 B2 , (9) 
i.e. 
   BB 12 . (10) 
In the steady state cycle, i.e. when ee 02    and 
02 yy  , output levels will be given:  




By , (11) 























By . (14) 
                                                            
1 From this point onwards, the superscripts B and O identify 
an element as, respectively, concerning the benevolent and the 
opportunistic incumbent. 
Plainly, in the case of output persistence being 
disregarded, inflation rates will be  
   11B , (15) 
 B2 , (16) 
i.e. 
  BB 12 . (17) 
Given that the economy functions in accordance to the 
correct model (2), the imperfect policies (15) and (16) 
















By . (19) 
Finally, it matters to present the differences between the 
use of the correct (c) and the imperfect (i) model by the 
benevolent incumbent. In terms of the inflation rates, 
011  
ci , (20) 
022 
ci  , (21) 
whereas, in terms of output levels, 
0211  
ci yy , (22) 
   222 ci yy , (23) 
which, in the stationary cycle situation, are given 
by 





ci yy , (24) 





ci yy . (25) 
Considering now the case of an opportunistic 
incumbent, the correct policy and outcomes will be, 
respectively, the values of inflation and output which 
result from the maximisation of (6) subject to (2) and 












 O2 , (27) 
i.e. 





  OO 12 . (28) 
In the case of output persistence being disregarded by 












 O2 , (30) 
i.e. 

  OO 12 . (31) 
The differences between the use of the correct (c) and 
the imperfect (i) model by the benevolent incumbent are 
as follows. In terms of the inflation rates, 
011  
 ci , (32) 
022 
ci  , (33) 











ci yy , (35) 
which, in the stationary cycle situation, are given 
by 





ci yy , (36) 





ci yy . (37) 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This note presents the consequences of output 
persistence being disregarded by the incumbent, being 
of special importance the case where the incumbent is 
electorally motivated. In this case, the typical pattern of 
the political business cycle may, indeed, lead the 
incumbent to consider that, in all circumstances, should 
implement contractionary policies at the beginning of 
the mandate, followed by expansionary policies at the 
end of the mandate. This behaviour implies that the 
incumbent may be disregarding output persistence, i.e. 
the consideration of an imperfect model. If this is the 
case, incumbent’s policies are suboptimal not only 
socially but also from the electoral point of view. 
In particular, when output persistence is disregarded, a 
sub-utilisation of inflation rates is to be observed at the 
beginning of the paper, which, in the steady state cycle, 
leads to an over-depression of output, followed by an 
over-expansion of output at the end of the mandate. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of short term political 
business cycles in output to the steady state cycle when 
the correct – i.e. taking into account output persistence – 
and the imperfect – i.e. when output persistence is 
disregarded – as models are considered . 
 
Figure 1 – The evolution of political business cycles  
As a direction for future improvements we would like to 
proceed with an empirical test of the results, for instance 
following the approach in Caleiro (2012). 
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